Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam

 

Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam – Gordon M. Goldstein

In many ways, this is yet another Vietnam War book. This one is a tad different in that former National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, is sort of the main focus of the book.  My guess is that author Gordon M. Goldstein set out to write a biography of the man, yet Bundy died shortly after the two of them met sometime around the mid-1990s, so the author had to change course a bit.   

Bundy served as National Security Advisor to both Kennedy and Johnson, and this fact alone makes this book an interesting read.  Much of the book is devoted to the differences in leadership styles of the two presidents, and there is a lot of speculation as to how and why the U.S. Government managed to get embroiled in such a mess in a place like Vietnam.  McGeorge Bundy serves as the perfect focus for such a narrative since he was front and center during the earlier years of the conflict.

Now, it needs to be pointed out that since McGeorge Bundy resigned as National Security Advisor in 1965, this is where the narrative of this book essentially stops.  There really is a lot more to tell about Vietnam, and most would agree that 1965 is just about the time when things escalated from so-so, to bad, and then to catastrophe.  So again, don’t expect a complete narrative of the conflict.

The book doesn’t suffer because of this, however.  In fact, most of the controversy surrounding Vietnam is focused on how and why the U.S. got involved, and all of this did, in fact, occur prior to Bundy’s resignation. Hindsight is 20/20, and other than Undersecretary George Ball, most of the cabinet and key political figures were in agreement that our military presence was needed in Southeast Asia in order to keep the proverbial dominoes from falling.  For the most part, Bundy was part of this group as well.

What makes this book stand out as opposed to the oodles of other books on Vietnam is watching and observing the behaviors of the two presidents.  The conclusions that the author gives us is that, even though we never could know what direction Kennedy would have gone had he lived, his experience and behavior surrounding similar issues would have caused him to eventually take a radically different path that wouldn’t have been nearly as calamitous.  In fact, we also get to read about the Bay of Pigs fiasco; mostly because the event hardened JFK’s resolve when it came to dealing with military “experts” and he vowed to never let them do his thinking for him again. This helps set his tone for Vietnam.

So once Lyndon Johnson is at the helm, we get the impression that he never really wanted to even be bothered much about the situation.  Johnson’s big focus was always his “Great Society” initiative, and that was where he wanted to devote his attention and resources.  When news from Saigon unexpectedly arrived from time to time, you get the feeling that LBJ would just push the issue off his desk and tell his staff to “handle it and just don’t make me look bad”.  Johnson never comes across as “presidential” as he should. Yes, a president needs to consult their advisors, but ultimately, great presidents know how and when to lead. Johnson seemed to be lacking in this when it came to Vietnam.

This book was a very good, clear read. Sometimes “war” books or “government” books can get buried too deep in the weeds with too much meticulous detail.  The author, though, manages to keep this book at a high level and it was always easy to keep the personalities and the events straight in one’s head.   He did tend to divert from his narrative time-to-time and “revisit” his meetings with Bundy thirty years after the fact around some issues, but as I’ve mentioned, Bundy seems to be the intended focus of the book, so such diversions aren’t too unwelcome.  In fact, one might argue that rather than a “history book” this book might be better served as a “doctoral thesis”.

For someone who knows very little about the Vietnam War and the personalities of early 1960s U.S. politics, it might be best to start with a broader, more encompassing volume.  If, however, you’ve read several books about events, this book serves as an excellent companion piece and does focus on areas (JFK vs. LBJ) that might not be readily available elsewhere.  Yes, McGeorge Bundy is the focus, and I came away thinking that the ground that was covered so well here really benefited from the fact that we witnessed so much of these high-level meetings through his eyes.